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Plenary & Breakout Executive Summaries



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THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Panel Executive Brief:

Reflections on/Introducing the Stabilization Assistance Review

The Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) examines best practices and core principals of foreign assistance to target United States stabilization efforts globally. The SAR will help integrate and coordinate United States government stabilization efforts across departments to maximize foreign assistance efforts.

Speakers

Raphael Carland - *Managing Director for Policy, Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (DOS/F)*

Jason Ladnier - *Director, Office of Partnerships, Strategy, and Communications (DOS/CSO)*

Stephen Lennon - *Director (USAID/OTI)*

Mark Swayne - *Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, SOLIC Policy (DOD/OSD)*

Moderator: Cameron M. Chisholm - *Vice President, Creative Learning; Founder, IPSI*

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- How to shift stabilization efforts to incorporate its inherently political nature.
- United States assistance needs to be coordinated between departments including the Department of State, Department of Defense, and USAID.
- How to learn from past stabilization and foreign assistance efforts to increase effectiveness in the future.

Key Recommendations:

- Burden-sharing and partnership approach will be key in effective stabilization and foreign assistance.
- Have to incorporate all three sectors, diplomacy, development, and defense, in stabilization and foreign assistance efforts globally.
- Cannot ignore the role of politics in stabilization. Need to plan approaches to these efforts with regards to political legitimacy and context.

Significance of SAR:

The SAR will be key in the coordinating and collaboration of U.S. stabilization and foreign assistance efforts globally. The SAR provides guidelines and clarity that will maximize these efforts by clearly defining best practices and core concepts in United States stabilization operations.

Panel Executive Brief: Multilateral and Bilateral Approaches to Stabilization

In order to have an effective stabilization implementation process, multilateral and bilateral approaches are absolutely essential. There is not a single actor that can carry out the goals of the SAR without external assistance. Thus, burden sharing among all relevant actors is necessary for success. The SAR, if implemented correctly, will be capable of linking prior knowledge and fundamental work on core concepts to create best practices and lessons learned – something that organizations are unable to do on their own.

Speakers

Peter McDermott - *Deputy Director, Stabilisation Unit, FCO*

Moises Venancio - *Regional Advisor, Iraq and Syria Crisis Countries, UNDP*

Moderator: Kristen Cordell - Senior Advisor, (USAID/PPL) SAR Lead

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- What can the international community do in regards to bargains with local elites? Support with international protection pacts, safe spaces.
- Collaboration, unity, and cohesion among relevant actors has always proven to be a major challenge.
- There is a need to engage and configure legitimate political approaches.
- International interventions have repeatedly contributed to the production of violence.
- Operational challenges: 1) defining long-term stabilization, 2) varied spectrum of activities, and 3) deciding the level to focus upon – local or national.

Key Recommendations:

- Local elites play the most vital role in supporting bargains and reducing violence.
- Prior analysis and shared vision about how to view a country long-term, and an understanding of what form of stabilization makes the most sense.
- International consensus is needed regarding the future trajectory of relevant countries; this analysis is crucial to setting appropriate short to medium-term goals.
- Key UN member states should provide both political and financial support.
- Donors should play to their strengths, leverage their individual capabilities.

Significance of SAR:

The SAR is an evolving concept and approach – not just in regards to bargaining with elites, but also opening to, and engaging with, local level populations for peace agreements; thereby overriding political elements. Stabilization is not for initiatives that will address the root problem, but rather, stabilization lays the framework for deeper policies and strategies.

Panel Executive Brief: Peacebuilding Perspectives from the Frontlines: Syria & Iraq

Previous stabilization plans have been vague and exacerbated pre-existing mistrust in the conflict-affected countries. Successful stabilization means bringing in the groups affected by a conflict and tailoring solutions to fit the public's needs.

Speakers

Linda Robinson - *Senior Policy Researcher, RAND*

Aya Aljamili - *Production Assistant, Al Jazeera*

Katherine Krueger - *Senior Advisor, Stabilization & Development, Creative Associates International*

Moderator: Moises Venancio - Regional Advisor, Iraq and Syria Crisis Countries, UNDP

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- No real clarified policy or political objective for Syria, which makes stabilization difficult.
- Kurdish role in the stabilization process still unknown.
- Post-ISIS governance means cooperation between Arabs and Kurds.

Key Recommendations:

- Civil-military coordination where the military is not running the show, but instead assisting in the planning process.
- Focus on how to deal with the trauma prevalent in the area so peacebuilders can prevent terrorist groups from forming.
- World Bank continuing its work in transparency and anti-corruption programs.

Significance of SAR:

We need to understand each community involved in Syria to have a successful stabilization process. This means programming and research that reflects the different ethnic and religious groups along with the different priorities and needs. Stabilization means looking for reconciliation after trauma.

Panel Executive Brief: Security Sector Reform and Stabilization

The challenges related to Security Sector Reform (SSR) are of two types: how we conceptualize it and how we program it. The concept of SSR needs to be broadened to include human rights, perceptions of fear, economic development, governance, and justice mechanisms. A good security sector is not just effective in suppressing threats; it is accountable to the people it serves.

Programming needs to be more inclusive. Local partnerships, complete with national political will, are seminal to SSR. Partnerships with the UN for peacekeeping, with the World Bank for development, and with other international partners, is key to creating an environment conducive to security.

Speakers

LTG Marc Caron - *International Security Sector Advisory Team, DCAF*

Dr. Stephen Watts - *Senior Political Scientist, RAND*

Melisa Dalton - *Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International Security Program, CSIS*

Moderator: Peter Quaranto - Senior Advisor for Peace and Security (DOS/F), SAR Lead

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- US security sector assistance is being spent inefficiently.
- Understanding of local partners, the nature of civil society, or their legitimacy, is lacking.
- Conversation with local and national partners is lacking in planning phases.
- Objectives of SSR do not always agree with national political will.
- Security problems are often regional and while one nation may cooperate, all regional players may not.

Key Recommendations:

- SSR should be understood as a political process, inclusive of governance, justice, legislation, and the media.
- SSR programming needs early identification and collaboration with local, regional, and international partners.
- The presence of UNDPKO makes SSR assistance most effective.
- Flexibility of communication should be maintained to be able to speak to different, sometimes conflicting, national interests.
- Civilian officials like US ambassadors need to engage in this political process.
- SSR should not be “reactive;” it needs long-term engagement and sustained M&E.

Significance of SAR:

Security sector reform and stabilization are closely related processes; both are inherently political. The SAR pays attention to conflict sensitive and tailored approaches to stabilization - the type of tailored approach that is needed in reforming a post-conflict security system. Therefore, lessons learned by SSR practitioners closely reflect the recommendations of the SAR.

Panel Executive Brief: How Do You Measure Success?

The data that we are able to measure at this point in time is richer than at any point in human history; the precision with which we are able to measure would have been unimaginable even 2-3 years ago. Yet the questions still remain: How do we define success? How should we measure data? What should we be measuring? And, finally, how should we be using those measurements? The way in which we answer these questions will help us immensely in conceptualizing and replicating success in stabilization efforts around the globe.

Speakers

Amb. Rick Barton – *Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University*

Sarah Scarcelli – *Deputy Director (DOS/CSO)*

Michael Dziedzic – *Vice President, Pax Advisory*

Moderator: Dr. Jacob Shapiro – *Co-Director, Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University*

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- Definitions of success in stabilization:
 - Success is tantamount to conflict transformation.
 - Providing attractive institutions and peaceful alternatives to conflicting parties.
 - “Have we saved any lives today?”
- Data collection is occurring, but data can be volatile and misleading – how can we adequately understand volatile data? What other factors are influencing data?
- Lack of unity, clarity, and accountability among government agencies has proven to be detrimental to effective data collection.

Key Recommendations:

- Comprehensive strategy must tie in to clear, precise, and realistic set of goals.
- Incremental successes are key to achieving larger goals; implementers must prioritize the importance of some goals and situations over others.
- Imperative to utilize local CSOs for their regional expertise in order to better understand the situation on the ground, deploy appropriate strategies, and understand success.
- Set people-centric goals and make sure people’s lives are actually improving.
- Government agencies must take this initiative seriously and elevate the importance of this document, definition, and report; if not, this stabilization strategy is destined to fail.
- Two ways to deal with the volatility of data: 1) gather many indicators and 2) understand why each indicator is telling you what it is telling you – are other external factors at play?

Significance of SAR:

The ability to effectively measure success is vital to the stabilization process. Knowing when and how stabilization processes are succeeding or failing assists implementers in replicating the necessary aspects of successful practices. Taking advantage of the innovative, precise data collection methods of the present day and understanding how to put that data to good use is paramount to effective stabilization.

Panel Executive Brief: Perspectives from the Frontlines: Ukraine

Ukraine is not a post-conflict state; there are areas of the nation under Russian occupation and any successful stabilization is contingent on Russia's cooperation. This is an international issue that is causing a humanitarian crisis in areas near the frontline.

Speakers

Ben Long - *Country Representative, (USAID/OTI) Ukraine*

Oksana Shulyar - *Deputy Chief of Mission, Minister-Counsellor*

LTC Jonathan Bleakley - *92nd Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg*

Dr. Terrence Hopmann - *Professor of International Relations, Conflict Management Program, Johns Hopkins SAIS*

Moderator: Lauren L. Van Metre - Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- This is a hybrid conflict with a civil uprising, Russian engagement, and some US involvement.
- There is an ongoing, multi-faceted hot conflict occurring in parts of Ukraine.
- US intervention, on its own, is unlikely to be helpful due to the nature of the conflict.

Key Recommendations:

- There needs to be cooperation among leadership from Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US in order to establish a political solution.
- Work on capacity building with partners and people on the ground.
- Implement mechanisms to support Minsk Agreement.
- Imperative to continue with civic engagement and going into communities in the hopes of making Ukrainians more invested in their communities and the future of their country.
- The US should maintain a strong position in order to get Russia to engage.

Significance of SAR:

While there are many international actors involved, Ukrainian civic engagement needs support in order to overall better Ukraine's future. Work purely through the EU, US, Russia, and Ukraine on a national level will not solve the issues that this conflict has caused.

**Panel Executive Brief:
Civil-Military Affairs and Expeditionary Diplomacy**

Civil and military cooperation has always existed with varying degrees of success. But for an effective implementation of the SAR, healthy civil-military cooperation must become the norm. Effectual institutionalization of this mindset will take time, training, and sustained efforts from the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), and USAID. A major dividend of such cooperation for stabilization efforts will be better communication and a better understanding of problems on the ground. A contextualized understanding of the conflict-affected country, acquired by the military as well as civilian deployments, needs to be communicated back to DC and across different levels of policymaking.

Speakers

BG Kimberly Field (ret.) - *Director, CVE, Creative Associates International*

COL Tony Thacker - *Chief, USCENTCOM, Interagency Action Group, Civil Affairs Operations Division*

COL Charles Burnett - *95th Civil Affairs Brigade Commander, Fort Bragg*

Jason Ladnier - *Director, Office of Partnerships, Strategy, and Communications (DOS/CSO)*

Moderator: Kevin Melton - Senior Civil-Military Transition Advisor, (USAID/OTI), SAR Contributing Writer

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- The “three Ds” do not have a common understanding of the problems faced during stabilization.
- There is disagreement on whether roles and responsibilities of agencies should be decided during the planning phase, or if policy should be flexible and shaped by facts on ground.
- Military actors do not communicate their concerns and ideas to other departments.
- Coordination between agencies slows down implementation. There is a trade-off between speed and deliberation.
- Civil-military cooperation is often dependent on personalities - some officers and diplomats are more cooperative than others, often causing a lack of sustained policy.
- Civilians, and not just the military, need to be on ground to understand the context. This will come through improved civilian co-deployment.
- Civilian co-deployment is limited by risk and physical security. The support of the military is necessary but attitudes to civilian deployment vary.

Key Recommendations:

- We need an integration of efforts in two ways. First, vertically across bureaucracies, from DC to the country level. Second, horizontally across the DOD, DOS, and USAID.
- Implementation needs more actors on the ground who understand the environment.
- For civilian co-deployment, we need to manage risk with the support of the military, rather than avoid it altogether.
- The evolution of civil-military cooperation will involve better communication and overall institutionalization of good relationships through education and training.
- It is important to recognize the respective strengths of civilian and military actors and incorporate them into planning.

Significance of SAR:

The SAR gives a “three D” view of stabilization by including the roles and responsibilities of the DOS, DOD, and USAID. The spirit of the document lies in the collaboration of these agencies. Thus, implementation of the SAR depends on effective communication between civilian and military actors, both on the ground and in DC. To operationalize this, the document recognizes the hurdles that need to be overcome for successful civilian co-deployment.

Panel Executive Brief: Transitioning War & Conflict to Peace & Stability

Post-conflict transitions must strike a balance between institutions and processes. While long-term institutions are necessary, we need to design institutions for the transition period that will prevent a relapse into conflict. Processes refer to a more vigorous participation of local communities and individuals in making decisions that would affect their future. Externally imposed solutions can deprive local and national actors of the agency to manage their own affairs. Thus, institution-building must be an inclusive process. For the US and other international actors, this implies a deeper engagement and understanding of contexts, resulting in flexible and adaptive approaches to stabilization.

Speakers

Frances Z. Brown - *Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

Katherine Donahue - *Acting Chief for Program Learning & Innovation (USAID/OTI)*

Ciara Knudsen - *Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary (DOS)*

COL Joe Holland - *Chief, Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division, J-5 Global Policy & Partnerships (DOD)*

Moderator: Kelly Uribe - Senior Policy Advisor, (OSD/SHA), SAR Lead

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- “Anecdotalism” refers to a focus on short-term success stories, instead of sustainable institutions. Methods of measuring success must be balanced between the short and long-term.
- Stabilization is not a linear process.
- Disruption of local leadership and power structures during conflict creates suspicion of external actors. Actions of the US government can create divisions between the haves and have-nots.
- There is ambiguity in identification of legitimate local partners.
- After the defeat of ISIS, there is a lack of consensus on how to deal with prisoners, formerly-affiliated women and children, amnesty, and reconciliation.
- Approaches to stabilization have been perceived as military centered and actors on the ground have not had access to interagency colleagues.

Key Recommendations:

- We need to think about long-term institutions as well as short-term institutions that would prevent conflict from disrupting democratic transitions.
- An understanding of the culture of the host nation and the political will of the host government is crucial.
- Processes require more attention in political transitions: engagement of people in decision-making processes and the provision of agency to manage resources.
- There is a need for flexible procurement mechanisms, decentralized management that privileges field staff analysis, and overall modest and time-sensitive goals.
- Programming should be flexible and be able to adapt and learn from the realities on ground. It should also involve targeting, sequencing, and an exit strategy.

Significance of SAR:

Stabilization is a transitional process and the SAR highlights an interagency focus on the field, where all three have the agency to observe and communicate with host countries. For the DoD specifically, the SAR implies an improvement of processes, policy, and doctrine.

Panel Executive Brief: How to Mobilize the SAR from CSOs & Implementers

The most challenging aspect of the SAR is its implementation. As a community of stabilization practitioners, it is incumbent upon us to translate this Washington-based product into field-based implementation with real results on the ground.

Speakers

Melanie Greenberg - *President and CEO, Alliance for Peacebuilding*

Megan Doherty - *Senior Director, Policy and Advocacy, Mercy Corps*

Amb. Charles Ries - *Vice President, International, RAND*

Moderator: Alexa Courtney - CEO, Frontier Design

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- There are numerous bureaucracy-related challenges inherent in stabilization.
- In order to achieve results on the ground, we need to collapse the space between Washington and the field and be inclusive.
- One problem is that civil society is not easily coordinated – among government and international organizations, civil society space has shrunk; it’s especially dangerous to be a civil society group in dissent.
 - How do we keep that space open, to allow relationships to flourish where we can create social cohesion and weave together civil society?
- What is the actual plan for civil society and non-USG for implementation, at both the Washington and country levels?
- How can we help build adaptability and partnership together in an incremental process?
- Definition of stabilization is going to look like an end-state, long-term vision. How do we reconcile that vision, while also understanding that we’re going to need short-term benchmarks?

Key Recommendations:

- Civil society partnerships, transparent and proactive communications with key national actors, and engagement with local community leaders are essential to the planning and implementation processes – local buy-in and ownership is key.
- Be clear about what we expect, what we can offer, and how we wish to utilize their expertise.
- Management of expectations – both our own and that of our partners and allies.
- Would be greatly beneficial to build adaptive learning into contracts – make sure that implementers are able to adjust in a rapidly moving context.
- Make small, realistic commitments – rushing in can fail.
- We are most successful when we are being led at the field level by people who understand local dynamics – we need to put structures in place that support this realm of success.

Significance of SAR:

The SAR succeeds in creating a framework for USAID, DoD, and DoS coordination, which is necessary to move forward. A joint political strategy is paramount to effective implementation of the SAR. The SAR

calls for innovation in ways and means, not necessarily in instincts. We have a better chance of success if there is a joint policy approach in Washington of supporting implementers in the field.

Panel Executive Brief: Multilateral Donors Response to Fragility & Conflict Prevention

Stabilization cannot be a unilateral or bilateral effort. It requires the engagement of partner nations, the private sector, international and regional organizations, as well as national and local actors that are subjected to stabilization. The timing of such engagement is a key consideration. The international community has long prioritized the funding of stabilization in already fragile nations; yet, the SAR embodies a growing recognition of preventive approaches to conflict. We need to assess risks, form probabilistic models, and engage multilateral partners early on.

The UN, in particular, is a legitimate strategic partner that struggles to articulate stabilization as different from peacekeeping, to provide resources for peace operations, and to reform itself as an institution. Beyond these limitations, the UN continues to be a key partner in stabilization operations.

Speakers

Laurel Patterson - *Senior Policy Advisor, Crisis, Fragility, and Resilience, UNDP*

Chuck Call - *Non-Resident Fellow, Brookings*

Moderator: Dr. Daniel Serwer - *Chair, Conflict Management Program, Johns Hopkins University, SAIS*

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- A change in nature and intensity of violence calls for a change in our approach to it.
- Communities with weak political and economic systems face additional pressures of conflict, including accommodating refugees and are often unable to manage these pressures.
- Development is related to peace, but there are concerns surrounding whether humanitarian funds should be diverted to security.
- Transitions within the UN have affected the way it operates in stabilization efforts. The election of UN-skeptic Donald Trump, consequent budget cuts, and tensions within the Security Council inhibit its ability to manage conflicts worldwide.
- There is no UN definition of stabilization. Peacekeeping does not “stabilize” places where there is no peace to keep and, instead, amounts to “babysitting”; countries consent to peacekeeping forces to essentially support *one* side against its opponents.
- The Peacebuilding Support Office has been starved of resources.

Key Recommendations:

- Within the developmental approach to stabilization, we need to move beyond poverty eradication and economic development and address *inequality*.
- Preventive and systemic approaches that include development and human rights are needed in addition to reactive operational approaches.
- There is a need to bring together different partners, including private sector actors like Amazon and Microsoft, to collect and analyze data about risk and form probabilistic models.
- We need to support the local and national ownership of conflict-preventing development and work closely with municipal and district councils. We should also consider faith organizations.
- We need better and more effective financing mechanisms.
- The US should work with the UN. The UN is a strategic, not operational, partner with its own legitimacy that the US cannot replicate.

- The US should work with regional organizations like AU, Arab League, and OAS.
- Preventive diplomacy is a great investment and needs to be funded. It doesn't cost much and has averted crises in places like Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Malawi.
- New technologies should be utilized in order to innovate peacebuilding.

Significance of SAR:

There was a time when organizations like UNDP and the World Bank would refuse to engage with the political aspects of stabilization; the SAR is significant for doing precisely this. It further emphasizes the importance of timely engagements of the US with international actors and organizations to facilitate a cost-effective and preventive approach.

Panel Executive Brief: Perspectives from Capitol Hill on Stabilization & Importance of SAR

Support from Capitol Hill representatives is absolutely essential to the successful implementation of the SAR. Without wide-ranging support and buy-in from Congress, carrying out effective stabilization efforts will prove to be extremely challenging. Members of Congress need to not only build good relations with other countries to pursue stabilization plans, but they also need to persuade their constituents that these international efforts are worth the money and beneficial for the United States.

Speakers

Mark Iozzi - *Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee*

Michael V. Phelan - *Senior Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate*

Laura Strawmyer - *Policy and Advocacy Manager, Alliance for Peacebuilding*

Moderator: Dr. Patrick Quirk - *Senior Policy Advisor (State/CSO), SAR Lead*

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- Congress is focused on the short-term even though the present government cuts diplomacy and development funding; members do not want projects pulled from underneath them.
- Lack of support among government officials for flexible funding.
- How will the political element of stabilization work? It must be separate from DoD.
- Questions still remain regarding the issue of funding.

Key Recommendations:

- Project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) will show constituents proof on how important it is that tax money goes into stabilization efforts.
- DoD cannot carry out these initiatives single-handedly; interagency cooperation is a necessity
- Increased advocacy for flexible funding for these initiatives.

Significance of SAR:

The SAR does a great job at presenting a case for interagency collaboration and presenting the combined results from many similar reports. Furthermore, the document emphasizes the importance of measuring impact; it is sometimes difficult to explain that we need the microdata as much as the macro. Consistent monitoring and evaluation of the impact surrounding stabilization initiatives is vital to persuading constituents that these types of projects are worth funding.

Panel Executive Brief: Perspectives from the Frontlines: Lake Chad Basin

Over 300 million additional people are projected to enter the Lake Chad Basin region in the next 30 years – it is a major migration corridor and that is not going to change any time soon. Future stabilization efforts must include measurable commitments to implementing long-term strategic plans.

Speakers

Amb. Dan Mozena - *Senior Coordinator on Boko Haram, (DOS)*

Elizabeth Winger Shevock - *Team Leader, West Africa, (USAID/OTI)*

Shareef Khatib - *Former Chief of Party, Creative Associates International, NRTI/NERI Project*

Jeremy “Jez” Haslam - *Senior Principal Global Practice Leader, Center for Secure and Stable States, DAI*

Moderator: Stacia George - Director, West and Central Africa and Haiti, Chemonics

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- There are issues with providing material goods to designated terrorist organizations (DTO) as well as DTO affiliates – this includes indentured servants, forced wives, children born in captivity, and the Civilian Joint Task Force.
- The Nigerian government is at least seen as being complacent – at most complicit – with the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency.

Key Recommendations:

- Creation of a formal framework for demobilization, deradicalization, reintegration, and reconciliation is necessary.
- Future stabilization efforts need to include measurable commitments to implementing long-term strategic plans.
- Develop assumptions based on research, act first, assess if the assumptions are right, and then adapt accordingly.
- Currently, there are secure regions that we should be entering in order to help with their stabilization and rebuilding efforts.
- Theory of change and evaluation at the activity level can feed into future long-term programs
- The main priority is maintaining a partnership with the USG.

Significance of SAR:

The USG and other actors in the international community can create change in the Lake Chad region if the SAR is implemented effectively. On its own, the military cannot stabilize the region. Civilian presence throughout the process is absolutely vital in order to secure the environment.

Panel Executive Brief: Justice Sector Reform & Stabilization

Injustice, in all of its forms, is a fundamental driver of conflict. Therefore, proper justice sector reform goes a long way in healing communities and strengthening society as a whole.

Speakers

Julie Werbel - *Senior Advisor, (USAID-CVE)*

Greg Ducot - *Deputy Director, ICITAP*

Amy Coletta Kirshner - *Acting Director, Office of Africa and Middle East Programs, State/INL*

Andy Michels - *Former Senior Security Sector and Rule of Law Advisor, (USAID)*

Moderator: Jenny Murphy - Senior Rule of Law Advisor, Creative Associates International

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- Challenge learned from Kosovo: lack of self-sufficiency because local groups rely on donors.
- Challenge learned from Iraq: poor social contract between police and the community because of no moral authority on behalf of the police.
- Challenge learned from Afghanistan: inter-agency complications.
- Our technical responses are often supply driven, and often don't meet the needs or demands of the people, which typically stem from justice-related issues.

Key Recommendations:

- Funding for justice sector reform needs to go to more than just police funding; criminal justice is just one of the sector's assets.
- Employ a more balanced approach, focusing on both security and justice.
- Focus on making the mechanisms transparent and accountable.
- Community-based justice and engaging non-state actors is just as important as building and engaging formal institutions; however, national ownership and responsibility is still necessary.
- Need for coordinated and clearly delineated roles and responsibilities among all actors.
- Need to build trust with host nation leaders and actors.
- We have improved with transitional justice, but employing restorative justice is also necessary in order to reestablish trust and social cohesion.

Significance of SAR:

Stabilization is based on context, and though the SAR asserts that stabilization is a political endeavour, justice should not be politically aligned. The SAR does well to emphasize the need for engaging local actors and utilizing a balanced approach among USG and non-USG actors; such approaches would also greatly contribute to successful justice sector reform.

Panel Executive Brief: Perspectives from the Frontlines: Successes & Failures of JSOTF-Philippines

The current conflict in the Philippines is the latest development in a series of insurgencies based on religious and economic grievances. The United States has been involved since WWII, but to successfully stabilize the country, the host government and military need to have the capabilities to work productively with the populations most affected by the conflict.

Speakers

Justin Richmond - *Executive Director, Impl.*

Dr. Joseph Felter - *Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia (DOD)*

Arjun Jain - *Senior Advisor, UNHCR Philippines & South Asia*

Moderator: S. Rebecca Zimmerman - Policy Researcher, RAND

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- In the Philippines, the major challenge is security assistance and stabilization; building military and government capacity, along with government legitimacy, will help overcome that challenge.
- Inadequately addressed by the government, historic economic grievances against Muslim minority groups in Mindanao greatly contribute to recruitment by radicalization groups, as well as other issues in the region.
- Displacement is a proxy indicator of other key issues in the region.
- Risk aversion is widespread in the international community.

Key Recommendations:

- Community-targeted initiatives to address conflicts and human rights issues.
- An increasingly holistic and wide-ranging approach is necessary.
- More focus should be on supporting the Filipino government's ability to solve domestic issues since the international community/USG has risk aversion to investing in work on the ground.
- Must support the Filipino government to solve its own problems.
- Support the people and government of Mindanao; seek out local solutions.

Significance of SAR:

The SAR is a comprehensive plan and should be utilized as such. In the Philippines, insurgencies are not the only problem, but also a visible symptom of domestic issues. A holistic, inclusive stabilization initiative that appropriately utilizes local actors within the country should help mitigate the wide array of domestic issues plaguing the Philippines.

Panel Executive Brief: Integrated Education & Training for Stabilization

Education and training of key implementers, employees, and other actors are essential to the successful implementation of the SAR; no policy survives a leader or policymaker that is uneducated or untrained. Moreover, we cannot have training without first having education. Many questions require informed solutions in order to properly integrate education and training programs that will make the SAR effective: Why has there been no staying power for similar, successful stabilization policies? How can we be most effective in preparing USG for stabilization environments? What can we do to make the SAR more effective? Who is the audience for this training and who do we want to be carrying out this training? What is the right content on which to conduct education and training?

Speakers

COL William Flavin – *(Ret.) Assistant Director, PKSOI*

LTC Arnel David – *COS, Army Future Studies Group*

Angela Kochukudy – *Foreign Affairs Officer Director, (DOS/CSO)*

Moderator: COL John Agoglia – *(Ret.) Director, Trinity Planning & Investments*

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- A major challenge is the institutionalization of training and education programs.
- Too often, training and education programs are personality and/or relationship-based, so progress ceases when transitions of power occur.
- Experience does not always equate to an increased level of competency; experienced people often make mistakes.
- In Bosnia and Kosovo, a successful training regime was established within a few years; but when USG entered Iraq and Afghanistan, implementers had forgotten the success in the Balkans –how can we institutionalize effective training programs across stabilization projects?

Key Recommendations:

- Establish tailorable content and delivery methods; these types of programs are crucial to the success of education and training initiatives.
- Training and education should occur at all levels of the stabilization process; although the intensity and content varies at different levels.
- Collaboration among agencies and experts is paramount to sustained success.
- Repeatedly reinventing the wheel is unhelpful and often counterproductive, so establishing tailorable, consistent, and institutionalized content is key.
- Working with local NGOs and CSOs is vital to the continued success of these programs.

Significance of SAR:

Integrated education and training programs directly contribute to the implementation of stabilization initiatives. If such programs are ineffective, then the SAR will prove to be a failure. Establishing unity and striving for collaboration among the wide array of actors involved in the implementation of the SAR will go a long way toward institutionalizing the education and training methods that are so vital to success within the stabilization process.

Panel Executive Brief: Peacebuilding Perspectives on Stabilization Implementation

Peacebuilding means actors, especially those who feel traumatized by the conflict, have their grievances heard. National, local and non-state actors need to all be heard or else pre-existing power dynamics that created the conflict are not reformed. Moreover, the varying USG actors – USAID, Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS)– must also coordinate with each other in order to ascertain every agency’s perspective and utilize their respective strengths in the stabilization process.

Speakers

Charles “Chic” Dambach - *CEO, Operation Respect*

Dr. Matthew Levinger - *Director, National Security Studies Program, The Elliott School, GWU*

Bridget Burke - *Director, West Africa and Haiti Region, Chemonics International*

Moderator: Dr. Johanna Mendelson Forman - *Senior Advisor, Stimson Center*

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- Legitimacy depends on public interest – how do we know which local actors are viewed as legitimate and how do we best utilize those actors?
- Radicalization is more often the result of marginalization than religious affiliation
- Challenges that stem from the political nature of peacebuilding

Key Recommendations:

- Need to bring local actors together
- Shared vision about future developments and goals among relevant local actors is crucial
- Local actors are not ipso facto good, so it’s necessary to use caution when supporting local actors and to understand the benefits and consequences of choosing certain local actors
- Need to stop separating mental health/trauma from stabilization works
- Perceived identity of peacebuilding initiatives is key – can contribute to the success or failure of stabilization efforts

Significance of SAR:

The SAR emphasizes how important it is to bring together all of the relevant actors from different sectors associated with the conflict. Additionally, the SAR endorses examining the multitude of factors that affect peacebuilding and stabilization initiatives. Understanding the cause and effect aspects of a given conflict is imperative, which is why local actors must be utilized appropriately.

**Panel Executive Brief:
Keynote Address: Defense Support to Stabilization**

It is important to think about alliances and partnerships both outside the USG and internally – the SAR can shrink the differences between USAID, Department of State, and other key actors.

Speakers

LTG Charles Q. Brown Jr. - *Deputy Commander, United States Central Command*

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- It is difficult to implement stabilization effectively without consistent, stable funding.
- We cannot use the same kinds of models and funding streams in different contexts; we must tailor our approaches to specific situations.
- The SAR provides an important framework, but how do we codify it?
- Security, governance, and service delivery are all essential to the stabilization process.

Key Recommendations:

- We have to look at stabilization holistically – important to make sure that we have a common sight venture.
- Three requirements for stabilization: 1) some level of security, 2) some level of governance, and 3) some level of service delivery.
- Planning for stabilization has to happen from the very beginning to ensure adequate preparation once the time for stabilization comes.

Significance of SAR:

This is why the SAR is important – we need to make sure teams have the right people, and this is something we don't do very well, but should. The SAR is a framework with which to begin taking action.

Panel Executive Brief: Conflict Prevention: Getting Ahead of the Curve

The Pathways for Peace Report is a United Nations-World Bank joint report focusing on cost effective prevention efforts. There is substantial overlap between the joint report and the SAR; hopefully that will make the process of shifting into a preventive mindset easier. Preventing conflicts before they begin is less costly than intervening in a conflict after it has already escalated into violence. Furthermore, establishment of conflict prevention initiatives is a fundamental step in the stabilization process.

Speakers

Corrine Graff - *Senior Policy Scholar, USIP*

Tine Knott - *Vice President, Center for Secure and Stable States, DAI*

Chuck Call - *Non-Resident Fellow, Brookings*

Tess McEnery - *Director for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, National Security Council, White House*

Kate Somvongsiri - *Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator (USAID/DCHA)*

Moderator: Paul Stares - *Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations*

Key Issues/Problems discussed:

- Donors can't keep spending money on humanitarian crises.
- Peacebuilders need to focus on prevention – conflict response is more expensive than conflict prevention.
- Widespread international tendency to avoid risk; this is a difficult obstacle to overcome, because intervening in any prevention situation is inherently risky.
- Major challenge is translating early warning into action on the ground; main issues are not analysis and early warning, but rather, appropriate action and prioritization.
- Inter-agency coordination in issues of prevention is not a strength of the USG.
- Preventive measures are effective, but there is not enough widespread buy-in.

Key Recommendations:

- Inclusive measures are vital for lasting conflict prevention; this goes for host nation governments and youth engagement. Peacebuilders need clear roles.
- Policy choices should be presented as acting preventatively or not, and the respective costs associated with each of those policies.
- Conflict prevention needs to address grievances through tailored solutions and targeted interventions.
- Investments in prevention programming help ensure future success in stabilization initiatives.

Significance of SAR:

The SAR understands that stabilization is a political endeavour for both the donor nations and the host nation, and that investments in prevention planning are essential to ensure future success in stabilization programs. The SAR further recognizes the importance of a unified USG approach toward stabilization and conflict prevention initiatives; without such cohesion, effective prevention initiatives will be difficult to achieve.



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