Competing Cascadias: Imagining a Region over Four Decades

In 1997, the distinguished architect and urbanist Robert Geddes offered the suggestion that “Cascadia” would be the “shock city” of the twenty-first century, following in the pattern set by in earlier eras by Manchester and Chicago, Los Angeles and Calcutta.[1] Come again? Cascadia? Where’s that, and why might it be more interesting to twenty-first century scholars than Shanghai or Mumbai or Sao Paolo?

For Geddes, as for Ethan Seltzer, Anne Moudon, and Alan Artibise, the trio of urban scholars who contributed “Cascadia: An Emerging Regional Model” to Geddes’s edited volume Cities in Our Future, Cascadia is a bi-national megaregion consisting of the Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver metro areas and the farms and forests in between (Figure 1: Cascadia as urban region).

The Cascadia Megaregion is the newest in a series of recent efforts to reimagine a regional identity for the northwestern coast of North America.

For a century and a half—beginning with the intrusion of Russian, British, and American fur traders, extending through imperial contests and boundary marking, through Anglophone settlement, and on through the dam-building and timber booms of the mid-twentieth century—the greater Northwest had a stable identity as region rich in natural resources and driven by their exploitation and development. Whether as the pre-national Oregon Country in the early nineteenth century or the U.S. Pacific Northwest and idiosyncratic British Columbia of the twentieth century, this was a remarkably constant region of the mind.

The vast territory has had subregions to be sure—an Empire of the Columbia, the inland sea from Olympia, Washington north to Campbell River, British Columbia, an Inland Empire (that’s the big one around Spokane, not the little one around Riverside). However, Wilbur Zelinsky’s now classic study of vernacular regions found the Northwest firmly in place in the 1970s. His study compiled and tallied the regional adjectives that

appeared in business and organizational names in the phone books of the 276 of the largest U.S. and Canadian cities. “Northwest” was the dominant regional marker in Boise, Spokane, Eugene, Portland, Seattle and Tacoma, and made a strong 2nd or 3rd place showing in Missoula, Billings, Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, Victoria, and Anchorage (as Canada’s windows to Asia, Victoria and Vancouver gave first place to “Pacific”). The regional core along Puget Sound and the lower Columbia River also joined the Canadian Maritime Provinces and the heart of Dixie in having the greatest regional self-consciousness as measured by the percentage of regional terms relative to all terms.[2]

Beginning in the same decade as Zelinsky’s study, however, that identity began to come unstuck. For the last generation it has been up for grabs with competing metaphors and definitions that suggest very different planning and policy responses. Journalists, boosters, advocates, and scholars have tried out a series of ways to conceptualize and shape a regional identity for the northern Pacific coast—as Ecotopia, as bioregional Cascadia, as boosterish Mainstreet Cascadia and as the Cascadia Megaregion. Think of the change this way: The old identity was like a reliable older automobile with lots of miles but well maintained and still perking along. Suddenly, however, it is too boring, too unfashionable, inadequately trendy, causing us to shop for an alternative—perhaps a Prius? A Smart Car? A Ford F-350 pickup? A Lexus? All have their strong points, but none seems to satisfy every need and expectation. Stepping back from the simile, the goal of this paper is to interrogate these changing ways for thinking about the regional identity of the old Oregon Country.

Central to the discussion is an exploration of the ways in which the recent regional concepts have developed in a dialectic, each building on the previous but also reacting to it in substantive ways. I will note empirical criticisms, for these “regions” live far more in the imagination than on the ground in social, economic, and political interactions, but my central interest is the ideas themselves.

My analysis also reads the contemporary regional identities against the previous and longstanding identity of the Northwest as a land of individual prosperity fueled by

abundant resources—the Eden at the end of the Oregon Trail, the promised land of the New Deal era.

In even larger context, I argue that all of the recent regional imaginings share an assumption that northwestern North America is best understood as separate from the rest of the continent, not as a component of continental systems and nations. They thus work counter to a century of Canadian and American nation-building. They are international in crossing the political border. They are nonnational in dissolving continental connections and identifications in favor of Pacific connections.

The Promised Land

Fish, furs, Douglas firs, and falling water—according to historian William Lang, these are the iconic resources that have long shaped the economy and public identity of the northwest coast—to which list we might add fruit orchards and fields of wheat to keep the alliteration going.[3] In cumulating layers their abundance produced a region deeply embedded in and indebted to its natural setting. Lang's essay moves in sequence from the pre-European "people of the salmon" through the Hudson's Bay Company, the settlement of Oregon Trail pioneers in the Willamette Valley, the shift of the timber industry from the Great Lakes to the Northwest, and the engineering of the Columbia River, put to work as an "organic machine" in Richard White's felicitous phrase to float barges, pump irrigation water, power an aluminum industry, and light Cascadian cities.[4]

Historian John Findlay in a trenchant essay has labeled the idea of a Northwest regional identity a "fishy proposition," arguing that such an identity was more often imposed from outside by boosters and promoters—from Hall J. Kelly pushing the virtues of the Oregon Country to railroad publicity departments marketing land. Nevertheless, the imagery of natural abundance still stands center stage.[5] Lang thinks that the imagery reflects the overlying realities of regional environment and economy, and Findlay thinks the reality is a bit shakier than the journalists and publicity departments might like to think, but nature—in the form of economically valuable resources—is still is the middle.

A third historian who has essayed a regional character portrait is Richard Maxwell Brown, who introduced the idea and imagery of the Great Raincoast of North America in several essays in the 1980s. Brown defined the Raincoast in direct contrast to Walter Prescott Webb's classic analysis in The Great Plains and his argument that aridity made the West a "perpetual mirage." Brown argues that the benign environment of the northwest coast inverts all of Webb's conclusions, It has always been a place of easy subsistence, not struggle, dominated first by fishing and farming and then by the Lumber Kingdom and the Kilowatt Kingdom. Moderate climate and economic abundance lead of "moderate conservatism" in public life, to "increasing cooperation and a rising sense of community." Although Brown draws conclusions about the region's political culture, his analysis remains grounded in the same layered resource economy that center Lang's' and Findlay's arguments.[6]

And all of these historians would likely agree that the first Cascadians were agents of European empires. Juan Francisco Bodega de Quadra sailed from California to the future Alaska panhandle in 1775. Alexander Mackenzie (1793), Meriwether Lewis and William Clark (1806), and David Thompson (1811) all explored routes from the Atlantic drainage to the Pacific. But I'd nominate George Vancouver as the first Cascadian. Between 1791 and 1795 he traversed and explored the American Pacific coast from California to Alaska, charting islands and fjords and leaving his name for two cities and a very large island.

From early on Europeans created institutions of governance that roughly matched the developing economic region. The North West Company after 1815 operated its fur trade through its Columbia District and New Caledonia (divided south and north by the Fraser/Thompson rivers). The Hudson's Bay Company absorbed the North West Company in 1821 and consolidated Pacific slope operations in a single Columbia District in 1827, managed the vast territory from Fort Vancouver on the Columbia River after 1829, and networked with California, Hawaii, and Alaska. Meanwhile, of course,

geopolitics created the jointly occupied Oregon Country from 1818 to 1846 in the territory formally renounced by Russia and Spain.

The formal border divided the territory but not the growing resource economy.[7] In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the northwestern quadrant of North America was in many ways a single arena for resource production. The United States-Canada border was permeable to migratory workers, settlers, and investors. Gold rush prospectors from California treated British Columbia as an American annex. Immigrant merchants and workers crossed and recrossed the border as members of binational family networks. Aboriginal Canadians provided a migratory labor force for Puget Sound mills. Timber workers and timber land investors worked both sides of the border. Canadians took fish in American waters and vice-versa. All of these examples confirm the interpretive framework outlined more than half a century ago by Marcus Lee Hansen in The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples, a study that emphasized the openness of the trans-continental border through most of its history.[8]

The natural resource era climaxed in efforts to construct what Lang calls "the New Deal's quasi-utopian, new Pacific Northwest." The guiding assumption was that the greater Northwest remained a frontier still open for development of its underutilized resources. The National Resources Committee (Figure 2: NRC regional planning map) described the Pacific Northwest as a realm of "forest, fisheries, waterpower, recreational beauties, harbors" and the Columbia Basin as a region of "rolling wheat lands" with great potential for "hydroelectric manufactural industries."[9] The rhetoric and confidence are sometimes breathtaking. Washington Senator Clarence Dill talked about "the future El Dorado."[10] Journalist Richard Neuberger, later to be elected to the Senate from Oregon, described the Northwest in 1939 as "the last frontier" and the "promised land," soon to be made fruitful and industrious by the "concrete Gargantuan" of Grand Coulee Dam.[11] Artists absorbed the same fascination with resource development. Dorothea Lange criss-crossed Oregon, Idaho, and Washington for the Farm Security Administration to photograph the successes (and failures) of the regional new deal as manifest in structures as small as new houses and as large as irrigation projects and WPA artists chronicled the

progress of dam building.[12] On contract to the new Bonneville Power Administration in 1940, Woody Guthrie celebrated the Columbia River dams and the "Pastures of Plenty" that they would nourish.

> At Bonneville now there are ships in the locks.
> The waters have risen and cleared all the rocks,
> Ship loads of plenty will steam past the docks,
> So, Roll on, Columbia, Roll On!
>
> And on up the river at Grand Coulee dam,
> The mightiest thing ever built by a man,
> To run the great factories for old Uncle Sam:
> It's roll on, Columbia, roll on!

Take a look at Life magazine's June 5, 1939 issue on "America's Future." Here were articles on the New York World's Fair with the General Motors Futurama, items on the new consumer wonders of aluminum cookware and nylon stockings, a feature on John Steinbeck's blockbuster novel The Grapes of Wrath, an essay on "The American Destiny" by Walter Lippmann, a piece on the first sports television broadcast, and a column about scientific innovations by Buckminster Fuller. Here also was a **nine-page** spread on the "Pacific Northwest: The Story of a Vision and a Promised Land." The land was "rich in nature's goods" and irrigation could make the Northwest bloom. The pictures were an Idaho ranch, the Anaconda smelter, a tower of boards in a Seattle lumberyard, Boise Valley irrigation, and at the end, "Grand Coulee Dam: Power and Promise." Grand Coulee and Bonneville dams together "will open up nearly the whole Columbia River to navigation, supply enough power to electrify an agricultural-industrial empire."[13]

These same worlds of production dominated the northwest imagination through the twentieth century. H. L. Davis chronicled the regional resource economy in Honey in the Horn (1935), showing his protagonist Clay Calvert working at sheep herding, hop-

picking, hay-making, and other agricultural variations. Norman Reilly Raine sent Tugboat Annie steaming in and out of Puget Sound's "Secoma" harbor in dozens of Saturday Evening Post stories from the 1930s to the 1950s. James Stevens claimed Paul Bunyan for the Northwest in 1925 and fictionalized the logging business in Big Jim Stevens (1948), to be followed by Ken Kesey's antisocial logging family in Sometimes a Great Notion (1964). Among the current generation, Craig Lesley's characters in River Song (1990) and The Sky Fisherman (1995) pick fruit, sell sporting goods to tourists, farm, and fish. Annie Dillard chronicled the evolution of a fictionalized Bellingham from farming settlement to mill town in The Living (1992). Molly Gloss writes about homesteading in The Jump-Off Creek (1989), logging in Wild Life (2000), and ranching in The Hearts of Horses (2007).

The liberal consensus that promoted federal policies and investments to support the private development of natural resources outlasted both World War II and Eisenhower era debates over public versus private power generation to survive into the 1960s. Columbia River dams lit booming cities, Northwest forests supplied the 2x4s and plywood that built California suburbia, Columbia River dams lit booming cities and helped to produce aluminum porch furniture for California patios, and the Alcan Highway linked the wilds of the Northwest to the even vaster frontier of Alaska. North of the U.S.-Canada border the provincial government of W.A.C. Bennett, in office from 1952 to 1972, vigorously pursued economic development and chamber of commerce capitalism ("The finest sound in the land is the ringing of cash registers" is a quote that captures the essential Bennett approach).

The era ended during the 1970s. In the United States the last dam on the Columbia rose in 1971 (John Day Dam), the last on the Snake River in 1972 (Lower Granite Dam). Canadians continued to dam the upper reaches of the Columbia as late as 1973 with Mica Dam and 1984 with Revelstoke Dam. The 1970s were likewise the last flush years for the Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and British Columbia timber industries. Soon a combination of economic recession, overcutting, technological change, environmental regulations, and global competition from places as distant as New Zealand

and Siberia put an end to what Paul Hirt has called the "conspiracy of optimism" that supported a generation of unsustainable harvests.[14] The time *was* ripe for rethinking regional identity, or, to revisit my metaphor, to go shopping on automobile row.

Competing Regionalisms

Ecotopia: The Consumer's Utopia:

The first alternative arrived not from the heart of the Northwest but from its fringe. Ernest Callenbach, Berkeleyite and editor at the University of California Press, coined the term Ecotopia for his 1975 novel of the same name. Callenbach imagined an environmentally ethical, energy-conserving polity in a newly independent nation covering northern California, Oregon, and Washington, which he detailed in his utopian fiction. The term passed into larger circulation in Joel Garreau's Nine Nations of North America (1981). The central interest of the ecotopian vision was the shaping of alternative social and economic institutions around conscious individual choices and *thoughtful consumption*. The actual place—the north Pacific coast—was a convenient and plausible locale for social and economic speculation

Ecotopia is a classic utopia in form and content. Utilizing the trope of the reportorial visitor, it purports to be the "notebooks and reports" of William Weston, a skeptical visitor slowly converted to seeing things the Ecotopian way. Ecotopia is idyllic and remarkably stable for a socioeconomic system quickly put in place only a few years before Weston's visit. Callenbach almost surely would have described Ecotopia as "sustainable" had the terminology been readily at hand in the early 1970s. Ecotopia is woodsy, a place of careful consumption and pastoral indulgence. The book highlights the sensual interaction of people with nature and with each other (William Weston is converted in part through easy sex). Ecotopia is a sort of Bohemian Grove for the mass market.[15]

As a national manifesto, Callenbach wrote Ecotopia as an alternative to the post-World War II "consumer's republic," but consumption still remains central. In context of the first oil embargo and the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth report, Callenbach made the challenge of Ecotopia how to support continued consumption through more careful production. In the spirit of the Whole Earth Catalog, the ecotopian goal is to continue "getting" the good life (even if redefined) through more careful and conservative "spending" of energy and natural resources.[16]

Journalist Joel Garreau, at the time on the staff of the Washington Post, took up the term "Ecotopia" in 1981 in The Nine Nations of North America. The popular book, which divided the continent among nine economic/cultural regions, now reads as one quarter D. W. Meinig and three quarters dated John Gunther. His Ecotopia stretches along the U.S. and Canadian coasts from Monterey to the Kenai Peninsula, citing the biophysical commonalities but actually emphasizing the most consumerist aspects of Callenbach's utopia (3: Ecotopia per Joel Garreau).The region is all about enjoying the outdoors, consuming nature through whitewater rafting, jogging, skiing, and other outdoors activity. As Garreau put it, "a thundering market" for natural amenities suddenly appeared in the 1960s and transformed the coastal strip into a region clearly separate from the "Empty Quarter," which is his name for the Rocky Mountains and dry plains.[17]

Nine Nations does not stand up very well after more than a quarter century. It draws expansive boundaries for Ecotopia but never addresses the potential contradictions of environmentalism as consumption choice. Nor does it acknowledge the problems of defining a cultural region that reaches from Big Sur and southern Alaska—what we might now call the long stretch from Nancy Pelosi country to Sarah Palin country. The paperback edition includes an image of Ecopotia that foregrounds a colorful pastoral landscape with a shining city in the background, which we assume to be full of urbanites ready for energetic outdoor recreation. We leave, even more starkly than in Callenbach's novel, with the vision that the identifying characteristic of the region is the consumption of landscape for personal pleasure.

Both books can be contrasted with the depth of Ursula LeGuin's imaginative ethnography of an alternative northern California in the curious and challenging novel Always Coming Home (1985).[18] The book tells about the Kesh, an agricultural people living in the Valley of the Na River in northern California. They are a people, she writes, "who might be going to have lived a long, long time from now." From maps that Le Guin carefully provides, we see that the Na is a version of the Napa Valley, lovingly depicted as "austere . . . generous but not lush," where long dry summers turn suddenly into wet, foggy winter, a land whose people intimately learn its meadows, rivers, roads, hills, and canyons.

Always Coming Home is not a traditional novel with recognizable plot. Instead, Le Guin gives us a potpourri of anthropological data: poems, songs, legends, and fables told by the Kesh; maps; drawings of artifacts; descriptions of burial customs, musical instruments and food; charts showing the "lodges" and "societies" through which the Kesh organize and sort themselves; and other such chunks of data. We pick the book up to sample, as we might wander through the collections of a museum.

Unlike straightforwardly progressive Ecotopians, the Kesh are deceptive.They seem to be–are–tribal and spiritual. They are literate, but they prefer to describe the world through recited poems and parables. They make no distinction between human and natural history. They seem in some aspects a sort of hippie feminist commune. Or, in another view, they follow a blend of European folk wisdom and Native American spirituality.[19] But the Kesh are *not* isolated and ignorant, nor are they always nice. Their young people sometimes wage unnecessary, deadly wars against their neighbors. Some Kesh are richer and some are poorer. They make careful and selective use of complex technologies to support their misleadingly simple lives. They use a wood burning railroad and consult a master computer, but these complex technologies are tools like any other, to be used in the real work of inhabiting their place consciously and carefully—perhaps closer than Ecotopians to the spirit of the "wise provincialism" advocated by the earlier Californian Josiah Royce.[20]

Cascadia: Bioregionalism as alternative production

Cascadia emerged in the 1980s as a direct challenge to the tasteful but celebratory indulgence of journalistic Ecotopia. This is a regional vision that takes ecology seriously, positing a "Great, Green Land" and giving natural systems first place. Articulated against both against both Ecotopia and the consumer's republic, it argues for a revolution in production—or nonproduction—rather than changes in consumption. The message is that people need to live for the benefit of fish and trees just as much as fish live and trees grow for the benefit of people.

"Cascadia" is the brainchild of Seattle University professor David McCloskey, who began teaching a course on the "Sociology of Cascadia" in 1978 (squarely in the Ecotopian moment). The terminology drew from the natural sciences, where it has been used to denote specific biotic and geological regions. In 1988, when McCloskey published stunning maps of Pacific Northwest river systems and ecosystems and accompanying manifesto, the recession of the early 1980s and two terms of the Reagan administration had made a political ecotopia seem tenuous. Instead, his Cascadia is an effort to forge a new awareness of human relationships with the regional landscape, drawing on the bioregional connections that Garreau only hinted at (while it also harkens back to the earlier era when resources trumped political borders). His evocative map is a picture of water and its flows from northern California to Alaska. Provinces, states, and nations disappear under the imperative of the hydrologic cycle that endlessly links Pacific Slope and Pacific Ocean (Figures 4, 5: McCloskey maps).[21] It is worth quoting McCloskey's eloquent language:

> Cascadia is a land rooted in the very bones of the earth, and animated by the turnings of sea and sky, the mid-latitude wash of winds and waters. As a distinct region, Cascadia arises from both a natural integrity (e.g. landforms and earth-plates, weather patterns and ocean currents, flora, fauna, watersheds, etc.) and a sociocultural unity (e.g. native cultures, a shared history and destiny).

> One of the newest and most diverse places on earth, Cascadia is a deep-furrowed, laminated and flowing land poured from the north Pacific Rim. The oldest myth of Cascadia suggests mountains rising from the sea. Rivers more ancient than today's Cascade or Rocky mountains continue to bind earth and sea and sky together in endless life-giving cycles.
>
> [There follows a roster of rivers like the naming of the Danaan host in Book II of Homer's Iliad] Columbia, Fraser, Skeena, Snake, Stikine [through] . . . Clearwater, Eel, Rogue, Deschutes, Bulkley, and Bella Coola.
>
> Cascadia is a land of falling waters.

McCloskey did not work in a vacuum. Bob Benson, an eccentric Portland socialist, vegetarian, and self-taught cartographer was there first. In the 1970s he drew a map of the maritime Northwest that Portland historian and activist Steve Johnson has called "the first iconic map of our region." Composed by hand in a tiny cabin on the long high ridge that overlooks Portland and the Willamette River, the map views the Northwest coast from a stance above the Queen Charlotte Islands, looking south across Vancouver Island, Puget Sound, and the Columbia Valley (Figure 6: Maritime Northwest map). Benson mapped air and wind just as much as McCloskey mapped water.[22]

Ecological Cascadia also gains evocative power from the way in which water itself reverberates through regional literature. Rivers fill titles of books: A River Runs Through It (1976), The River Why (1983), River Song (1989), Riverwalking (1995). Daphne Marlatt's long poem Steveston (1988) depicts a Japanese Canadian fishing community on the Fraser River, where "this river is a riveting urgency." Rainstorms pounding off the Pacific structure Ivan Doig's Winter Brothers: A Season at the Edge of America (1980), introduce H. L. Davis's Honey in the Horn (1935), and drive the action in Don Berry's Trask (1960) and Ken Kesey's Sometimes a Great Notion (1964), The first paragraphs of the latter are virtually a prose reproduction of McCloskey's map:

> Along the western slopes of the Oregon Coastal Range . . . come look: the hysterical crashing of tributaries as they merge into the Wakonda Auga River . . . The first little washes flashing like thick rushing winds through sheep sorrel and clover, ghost fern and nettle, sheering, cutting . . . forming branches. The, through bearberry and salmonberry, blueberry and blackberry, the branches crashing into creeks, into streams. Finally, in the foothills, through tamarack and sugar pine . . . and silver spruce--and the green and blue mosaic of Douglas fir--the actual river falls five hundred feet . . . and look: opens out upon the fields. [23]

The evocation of water highlights an important geophysical connector, but tends to conceal some of the physical differences that make an expansive Cascadia at least a bit problematic. The Salish Sea—a modern name that evokes native peoples to encompass the inland sea of the Strait of Georgia, Strait of Juan de Fuca, and Puget Sound--connects the Washington and British Columbia coasts and islands, but not Oregon or California. The Cascade Mountains are a chain of volcanoes that march from northern California to northern Washington, but the convoluted granite ranges of British Columbia, Idaho, and Montana have a different origin and character. Moreover, the Fraser and Columbia drainage basins span two very different ecosystems, only one of which is great and green. The other is variously great and black where Columbia Plateau basalt shows through, great and brown much of the year, great and golden when wheat is ripe. Modern literary travelers have seldom spanned the entire territory. Sallie Tisdale's "cascadia" ran from Mount Shasta to the Olympic Peninsula, Jonathan Raban's coastwise from Seattle to Juneau.[24]

Dissimilarities aside, Cascadia and Ecotopia both came out of a distinctive regional political culture. The San Francisco Bay Area, Portland, and Seattle were all centers of grassroots work on sustainable agriculture, communal living, alternative energy systems, and other reevaluations of consumer society in the period roughly from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. In addition to The Whole Earth Catalog , as already mentioned, there were Seriatim and Rain magazines, edited out of El Cerito and Portland in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Farallones Institute advocated new forms of

architecture from northern California Writers such as Californian Gary Snyder and Oregonian Barry Lopez articulated deep environmental perspectives. Meanwhile, the tortuous ranges and hidden valleys of the coastal mountains were fertile territory for communes and marijuana farms.[25]

Environmental activists and organizations have since made bioregionalism a keystone of environmental work and environmental history at multiple scales in all corners of the world.[26] In the Northwest, "ecotopia" and "ecotopian" have dropped out of general use except for ironic commentary, but Cascadia has continued to name a variety of causes. An International Cascadia Alliance of thirteen environmental groups lobbied, unsuccessfully, for a Cascades International Park in the early 1990s.[27] There is a Cascadia Region Green Building Council, a Cascadia Weekly (which is an arts and commentary newspaper from Bellingham), and a Cascadia Times (doing investigative reporting on regional environmental and natural resource issues). The good planning advocates at Seattle's Sightline Institute (previously Northwest Environment Watch) has adopted McCloskey's Cascadia as its territory of interest and publishes a "Cascadia Scorecard" to rate the regions states and cities. There are websites: CascadiaPrime, Cascadia Rising, Cascadia Commons. As this paper is written, a group of tree-sitters calling themselves Cascadia Rising Tide have just been arrested for blocking a southern Oregon timber sale.

Perhaps the most effective repackaging of McCloskey's Cascadia is the idea of Salmon Nation, developed and popularized by Ecotrust, a Portland-based nonprofit that works for sustainable economic development and microenterprise (Figures 7, 8: Salmon nation map and logo). The purpose of Salmon Nation is to enlist bioregional analysis on behalf of policy advocacy. The "Nation" is big: "Outlined both by its coastline and by the rivers that reach deep into its lands, Salmon Nation's geographical boundaries are simply defined: anywhere Pacific salmon have ever run." The map of Salmon Nation (subtitled "a region defined by natural boundaries") stretches the region from Arctic Yukon and Alaska to southern California. Salmon Nation is also "a community of caretakers and citizens that stretches across arbitrary boundaries."[28]

Mainstreet Cascadia: Efficient Production

"Mainstreet Cascadia" is a regional economic development vision that stands in clear contrast to bioregional Cascadia (Figure 9: Mainstreet Cascadia).[29] It draws on a long history of economic boosterism with its attention to Pacific markets, but it developed in the specific context of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989 and the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994, with their promise of increased cross-border trade. More broadly, it is an effort to envision the local consequences and opportunities that result from the global shift away from a production/manufacturing economy to an information/services economy. Its advocates are free market cascadians in the terminology of political scientists Susan Clarke and neoliberals in the trenchant analysis of geographer Matthew Sparke. It is also the version that has most fully manifested in institutional arrangements, attracting the attention of social scientists who want to examine its practical effects. [30]

On one dimension, Mainstreet Cascadia has been an exercise in "rebranding" by figures such as Paul Schell, variously a Seattle real estate developer, University of Washington dean, and Seattle mayor (who had the misfortune to invite the World Trade Organization to convene in his city in December 1999). The promotional rhetoric was honed by the Discovery Institute in Seattle, the Cascadia Institute in Vancouver, and New Pacific magazine, devoted to the "dynamic megastate" that spans "geopolitical boundaries that have limited regional understanding [and] are rapidly becoming vestiges of the past" (although the magazine soon failed because it found neither audience nor advertisers). Robert Kaplan nicely captured the boosterish version for The Atlantic Monthly in 1998 that "what has emerged is nothing less than a strategic alliance of the business elite from Portland to Vancouver"[31] For committed bioregionalists, this rebranding is blatant hijacking. For other observers it is evidence that Cascadia is first and foremost a mental construct.[32]

In the twenty-first century, with key figures like Paul Schell out of office and entrepreneurial academic Alan Artibise relocated from Vancouver to the central United States, the promotional energy has lagged. Corporations briefly toyed with Cascadia as an advertising concept and travel agencies still offer Two Nation Vacation packages—although the term has also been appropriated for Maine/Maritimes, New Mexico/Mexico, and many other variations (Figure 10: Vansecoma/Portlecouver ad). "Cultural Cascades" is simply a listing of arts events in Vancouver, Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, and Eugene.[33]

The second dimension has been the construction of bi-national organizations and institutions that have emerged, in Susan Clarke's words, as "institutional fixes" in response to global competition. The most elaborate of these lobbying and coordinating organizations is the Pacific North West Economic Region, begun in 1991 as a cooperative effort among the legislatures of British Columbia, Alberta, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Alaska. Already crossing the continental divide with Alberta and Montana, the PNWER came further unstuck from a bioregional Cascadia with the addition of Saskatchewan and the Yukon Territory. Essentially intended "to leverage regional influence in Ottawa and Washington," it has a substantial roster of conferences and working groups on agriculture, environmental technology, forest products, government procurement, telecommunications, tourism, trade and finance, and transportation. With sprawling territory and limited economic and cultural coherence, PNWER is essentially an alliance to work for federal investment and favorable national regulations—not much different from single nation organizations like the Western Council of State Legislatures.[34]

The Pacific Corridor Enterprise Council is a BC-Washington organization with membership drawn mainly from private businesses. It formed in 1989 "as a non-profit, business organization to promote cross-border transactions and advocate the removal of barriers that impede the legitimate flow of people, goods and services across the Canada/USA border." PACE "fosters and works toward the development of mutually beneficial trade and travel policies, and the elimination of unnecessary legal and political

barriers between the two nations." In practical terms, this means mobility for knowledge workers and improvements to transportation.[35]

Also on the institutional list is the Cascadia Center for Regional Development, housed within Seattle's Discovery Institute (it was the Cascadia Project when founded in 1993). The motto is "Cascadia: Committed to Commerce, Community, and Conservation." But the focus—we might see this coming—narrows down to better intermodal freight systems, high volume surface transit, and improved metro transportation planning.[36]

In practical fact, the border has become tighter rather than looser in both the long run and short run. The porous boundary of the nineteenth century began to constrict in the mid-twentieth century. North of the international border, Canadian nationalism intensified after 1920, with results apparent in Canadian attitudes toward to the Alaskan border and the Canadianization of European immigrants.[37] The U.S. added Canada to the system of national immigration quotas in 1931 (lumping it as a British nation). In 1996, Congress required everyone entering the US to have a visa and leave on their departure date, and exempted Canada only after several years of intense lobbying from both sides of the border. Then came the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, bringing emergency closures that backed traffic up for fifteen miles at some major crossings. The twentieth century border was more tightly controlled than that of the nineteenth century, and the twenty-first century border is tighter yet, with armed soldiers at lonely crossing points and Americans required to show passports to reenter the United States.[38]

The western border is permeable for personal consumption such as shopping and vacationing. Vancouver and Seattle news media depict the other city primarily as a scene for consumption. Shoppers and vacationers flood across the BC-Washington border, with the direction of the flow depending on exchange rates and real estate markets.[39] Nevertheless, national pride and identity still override efforts to define common agendas for the organization of economic production. Immigration and capital investment still take place within national borders. It makes a difference whether a Korean electronics

firm decides to invest its $2 billion in Oregon or British Columbia. It makes a difference whether someone from Hong Kong decides to move to Vancouver or Seattle. The government of British Columbia blocked the implementation of a Cascadia Corridor Commission (authorized by both national governments) because of fears of subordination to Seattle--a mirror of worries about the Alaska Highway fifty years earlier. Canadian concerns have been heightened by the effects of NAFTA on Canadian branch plant manufacturing. High speed rail links to the southward meet similarly mixed reviews because of their possible erosion of Canadian distinctiveness and Canadian businesses.

Nor has bi-national trade quite lived up to expectations along the Pacific coast. Transportation investments have not been made and leave both rail and road systems poorly articulated. In the post-NAFTA nineties, trade with British Columbia accounted for only 2.6 percent of Washington state's gross domestic product. Another econometric test suggests that British Columbia's degree of economic integration with the United States is less than that of Canada as a whole.[40] British Columbia does less of its trade with the United States than does the rest of Canada.

Political scientists thus end up with skeptical conclusions. "Transborder regionalism in Cascadia is ad hoc and episodic," write Donald Alper. "It is not a movement for merging the laws and policy processes of Canadian and U.S. jurisdictions. It is neither the creation of supranational institutions, not does it signal an end to, or even severe erosion of, the border." Gerard Rutan similarly found little institutional connection or cooperation between Washington state and British Columbia. Instead, "what has emerged is the picture of two quite separate jurisdictions, each often pursuing its own ends on its own side of the border . . . there is no consistent desire for a relationship beyond . . . the directly problem related, on the part of either jurisdiction."[41] Instead, we find lots of talk in working groups, conferences, roundtables, committees that seem, at best, to produce some policy parallelism and the agreement that *something* needs to be done to improve congested transportation.

Cascadia as city-state

The idea of a Cascadia Megaregion dates from the late 1990s, developed both to advance and to clarify the increasingly nebulous idea of a regional economic alliance. According to its proponents, a megaregion is a large connected network of metropolitan areas that share enough economic and cultural similarities to be useful units for policy decisions. A recent definition emphasizes the "economic functionality" of megaregions and the concurrent emergence of "cultural identity" emerging from this shared economy.[42]

Interest in megaregions in North America emerged from the New York-oriented Regional Plan Association, which convened an initial conference in the early 1990s. It took on new life when Robert Yaro of the RPA and Armando Carbonell of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy taught a planning studio at the University of Pennsylvania and the Lincoln Institute and RPA convened roundtable meetings. In 2008 the RPA helped to form America 2050, a group of planners, business people, and policy makers. The evolving ideas—we might call them a moving target--have been repeatedly published in the planning magazines, essay collections, and a variety of web-based documents. , and in 2009, a book edited by Catherine Ross.[43]

The grand regional thinking embodied in the America 2050 project can be placed in several frameworks. It certainly updates the megalopolitan analysis that Jean Gottmann and Constantinos Doxiadis popularized in the 1960s.[44] More directly, it is also animated by a desire to emulate the urban-regional strategies that have developed in Europe under the aegis of the European Union, such as the European Spatial Development Perspective of 1999, and in East Asia in the wake of economic boom. Europeans since the 1980s have explored the ways in which sets of metropolitan areas string together in larger spatial units that sometimes get cute names like the Blue Banana that curves from Manchester to Milan and the Golden Banana along the Mediterranean coast from Valencia to Genoa (the cosmological analogy is galaxies and galactic clusters). A European alternative is to describe a 20-40-50 pentagon defined by London, Paris, Milan, Munich, and Hamburg and presumably containing 20 percent of the area of the European Union as of the early

1990s, 40 percent of its population, and 50 percent of its gross domestic product. In Asia the term of art is now "mega-urban region" or MUR. Armando Carbonell, Mark Pisano, and Robert Yaro make this clear in their 2005 document on "Global Gateway Regions" when they write: "As the number of economically competitive regions grows around the world, America's cities need to band together in order to strengthen their role in the global economy" and elsewhere that it is important to "facilitate the emergence of nine new Mega-regions that can compete with similar emerging networks of cities in Europe and Asia" The same idea is front and center in the title of the new volume edited by Catherine Ross with contributions by a murderer's row of regional planning scholars: Megaregions: Planning for Global Competitiveness.[45]

A challenge for this grand spatial thinking is to identify a realistic scale for the expected robust economic interactions. Multi-city regions can include long recognized conurbations like the English Midlands and the Dutch Randstadt, emerging conurbations like China Pearl River Delta and Shanghai-Nanjing, potential bi-national regions such as Copenhagen-Malmo, and what seem like rather imaginative constellations spanning hundreds of miles like Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-St. Petersburg, Madrid-Seville-Lisbon, and (perhaps fetched furthest of all from the imagination) a Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo Corridor that loops blithely across both the Sea of Japan and some hundreds of miles of non-capitalist North Korea.. Similarly the current North American analysis includes some regions with a clear historic and current identity, such as the Boston-Washington corridor, the Great Lakes industrial region, the San Francisco Bay area, and Southern California. Others seem more dubious. Denver and Salt Lake City do not constitute a meaningful multi-city region as listed by Jonathan Barnett, a point clear to anyone who has driven the long, dry road past Glenwood Springs, Rifle, Grand Junction, Fruita, Green River, Price, and Provo. Nor is it clear whether there is a functional Gulf Coast metro-region from Corpus Christi to Mobile or an I-35 region from San Antonio to Kansas City as posited by researchers at Virginia Tech.[46] Even America 2050 is a bit uncertain of the exact list, saying in 2005 that there were nine but only showing eight on a map, then upping the count to eleven on its current (as of July 2009) map (Figures 11, 12, 13: US megaregion maps).[47]

As suggested briefly above, advocates of the Megaregion approach in northwestern America see themselves as offering a positive synthesis. In so doing, they lose some of their regional specificity, since all of the dozen or so North American megaregions have to have something in common. The result is a tendency to generalize into standard triple-bottom-line sustainability rhetoric, as in the invocation of prosperity, equity, and environmental sustainability in "Global Gateway Regions" [48] If Ecotopia is the hook, Cascadia-1 is the real starting place, and Mainstreet Cascadia is the businesslike alternative, then Megaregion Cascadia tries to combine the best all approaches. We can see the evolving imagery of the mega-region from an early schematic doodle through more detailed depictions (Figures 14, 15, 16: Cascadia megaregion maps).

The Cascadia Megaregion does seem to have some ground truth. Most broadly, the social and cultural values of western Canadians are closer to those of the adjacent United States than is the case in other parts of Canada.[49] There *is* a single string of large and middle-sized cities along a highway/rail corridor (Eugene, Salem, Olympia, Tacoma, Bellingham, and Victoria in addition to Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver). The most recent map seems to add Yakima from east of the mountains, but not Spokane, Richland-Pasco-Kennewick, or Bend. At least along the main corridor, the cities and region share some social and cultural commonalities, particularly in their orientation to the outdoors, as well as similar commitments to strong growth management systems.

Nevertheless, idea of a unified Cascadia Megaregion faces a number of questions, starting with all of the practical challenges of tightened borders listed for Mainstreet Cascadia. In addition, there is little complementarity among its three major cities. On the Pacific coast, the often-cited model is the San Francisco Bay area where high finance San Francisco, high tech San Jose, thoughtful Berkeley, and brawny Oakland work as a metropolitan team.[50] When we turn back to Cascadia, however, we find a different situation. The three cities are too distant from each other for effective everyday interaction (the same distances as Prague-Vienna-Budapest, which proved an unstable

combination in 1918 despite centuries of Hapsburg effort to the contrary). They are also too similar to form a complementary whole on the analogy of the Bay Area. Rather than meshing into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, they continue to compete for trade, transportation linkages, and foreign investment The cities have grown and prospered as east-west gateways, competing with the others as a gateway to the Pacific and Asia for continental markets. For a specific example, Japanese trading companies tend to operate offices in all three of the major cities, replicating functions "rather than organizing their operations in a way that might attest to a singular pattern of Cascadian economic integration." They are competitive rather than complementary, especially Vancouver and Seattle, which would each see itself as the favored center, while Portland chafes at a supporting role.[51]

Moreover, each metropolis is large enough to support a full range of services ranging from research universities to advertising firms. A Portlander need not go to Vancouver to seek out a sophisticated architectural firm, and a Vancouverite need not go to Seattle for transpacific container service or air connections. In other words, it is not clear that the three cities working together are necessarily more than the sum of their parts. A realistic expectation for Main Street Cascadia may be less a merger of well-matched parts than a federation of otherwise similar city-states--a sort of Hanseatic League for the twenty-first century. Anything more would require conscious decisions to generate economies of scale by systematically designating and developing agreed-on areas of economic specialization—a challenge in that Oregon and Washington have very different political cultures and styles of doing the public business, British Columbia politics look eccentric from south of the border, and Alaskans definitely march to their own drum and bugle corps. What remains, as for Mainstreet Cascadia, is the bedrock concern of transportation and energy infrastructure, topics that have long been central to cross-border management [52] Although locally claimed (as by several cohorts of Portland State University planning students who have produced increasingly elaborate reports on what they term "Ecopolis"), the Cascadia Mega-region looks like one more example to add to John Findlay's list of regional identities imposed from outside.

It's Own Separate World.

These multiple imaginings of region may be in sometimes testy dialog with each other, but they also share an important element in common. Each is in some degree a secessionist imagining that reaches back in time, past the 150 year history of the promised land, to the geopolitical visions of the early nineteenth century.

Long before the era of railroads, continental visionaries like Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Hart Benton (speaking in 1825 on the Oregon question) anticipated sister republics on the Pacific slope—independent but friendly nations settled and developed by free English-speaking Americans from the "original nest" along the Atlantic seaboard. Explorer Charles Wilkes, in the early 1840s, similarly anticipated that "the situation of Upper California will cause its separation from Mexico before many years. . . . It is very probable that this country will become united with Oregon, with which it will perhaps form a state that is destined to control the destinies of the Pacific."[53] The Mexican War and Gold Rush mooted the option for California, but it was achieved, for a few decades in the form of the American-dominated Kingdom of Hawaii and a few years as the Hawaiian Republic of 1894-98.

These early imagined and/or actual nations reflected the dominance of maritime connections. The British, Russian, and American fur trade was supplied and carried on along and across the Pacific, connecting Kodiak Island and New Archangel, Nootka Sound, Fort George/Astoria, Fort Vancouver, Spanish California, and the Hawaiian Islands to the Atlantic world.[54] The key towns of the first generation were sited for navigation and Pacific connections—Victoria on an island at the entrance to the inland sea, Port Townsend on a peninsula jutted into the entrance to Puget Sound, Portland at the head of navigation on the Columbia/Willamette system.

In contrast to the Jeffersonian vision and to early commercial patterns, the great geopolitical projects of 1850-1950 were to connect western North America directly to the east and tie together two continental nations.

The process in the United States is embedded into the central national narrative. In the aftermath of territorial acquisitions in the 1840s, railroad building, capital flows, and trading partnerships that redirected historic and "natural" north-south flows of people and trade into east-west flows. This was accomplished first by attaching the Ohio Valley to the Northeast rather than the Gulf South in the 1850s, the fundamental prerequisite for Union victory in the Civil War. The project followed with the era of transcontinental connections to Puget Sound, Portland, San Francisco, and Southern California and the national integration of the West as an economic colony of the industrial core along the northeastern seaboard and the Great Lakes.[55]

For U.S. audiences, the Canadian story merits a bit more detail. As the fur trade declined, Britain organized its chunk of Pacific North America as two separate crown colonies—Vancouver Island in 1851 and British Columbia in 1858, combined only in 1866, seven years after Oregon statehood. With the unpromising granite of the Laurentian Shield, vast prairies, and convoluted mountains separating British Columbia from the St. Lawrence Valley, the colony certainly had the potential to evolve separately into an independent nation as a sort of North American New Zealand to the Australia of eastern Canada, with Victoria standing in for Wellington and Vancouver for Auckland. Out of the sense of isolation as well, a group of BC residents in 1869 petitioned for annexation to the United States, and the province was essentially bribed into Canada in 1871.[56]

What followed was the creation of "Canada" as an economic as well as political union. Central here was the National Policy that Premier John A. Macdonald introduced in 1879, designed to develop an autonomous economy on an east-west axis as the U.S. erected post-Civil War tariff barriers. The Canadian Pacific Railroad was the centerpiece. The CP reached Burrard Inlet in 1886, creating the city of Vancouver and supplementing BC road systems that ran eastward from the coast while carefully avoiding connections to the United States.[57]

The new regional imaginary runs against that mission or cause, and explicitly or implicitly argues for secession, for treating the region as something different from, apart from, detached from the rest of the nation(s). "The Far Corner" as journalist Stewart Holbrook called the region, or "upper left coast" in more recent political jargon to recognize the political tendencies of ecotopian territory.

Callenbach's Ecotopia, of course, depends on literal secession from the United States. Criticized for assuming a revolution rather than demonstrating how a "green" nation might emerge, he followed the 1975 book with Ecotopia Emerging in 1981. The revolution remains a thought experiment rather than an exploration of the real challenges of political action. A high school student invents an improved photovoltaic cell and decides to make it available to everyone; her mother organizes "cancer commandos" and the greens organize as a political party; an episode of rather non-ecotopian nuclear blackmail forces the unenlightened parts of the United States to accede peacefully to independence and Ecotopia is born with a citizenry who want little to do with the old country.

In bioregional Cascadia, separation appears in the cartographic rhetoric. In McCloskey's key map, the rivers all run westward, while the rest of the continent is a blank, unknowable territory . . . or not worth bothering about. A second map that shows the rivers that drain eastward and northward from the Cascadian mountains offers far less detail about Missouri, Saskatchewan, Mackenzie, and Yukon rivers than it does about the Fraser and Columbia (Figure 17: McCloskey map) . It's the waters that tumble into the Pacific that really count.

Portland-based Ecotrust has picked up and developed the same theme in its own efforts to remap the Northwest. It identifies its home territory as the temperate rainforest that the Northwest shares with other western coasts (Figures 18, 19: Temperate raiforests). In effect, its map suggests that Cascadia should be understood as part of a discontinuous region that includes coastal Tasmania, New Zealand's South Island, southern Chile, Norway, and Caucasian Georgia rather than a part of continental North

America.[58] The boundaries of a true "Salmon Nation" would encircle much of the Pacific, including Chile, New Zealand, Siberia, Kamchatka, Hokkaido, and even the very non-ecotopian Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Laurie Ricou has also pointed out that fiction and poetry from the Northwest is filled with characters who reach and balance on the continental edge, looking westward to Asia and thinking themselves on the very edge of things.[59] Annie Dillard's settlers of a fictionalized Bellingham in The Living (1992) arrive by sea and live by the sea. Clay Calvert in Honey in the Horn (1935) reaches the Oregon coast to stand on "the very last land on the continent," a place that Don Berry's mountain men previously reached in To Build a Ship (1963) and Trask (1960), where the protagonist's journey literally balances him on the knife edge of the continent over the surging ocean. Doig in Winter Brothers meditates on the life of Thomas Swan, "a being of out continental edge, rimwalking its landscape and native cultures."

Cascadia-2 is perhaps the version that holds most tightly to the continent by virtue of its emphasis on a north-south Anglophone community. Nevertheless, its promoters repeatedly cite data that purport to show that a separate Cascadia would be the world's tenth or eleventh or maybe twentieth largest economy. Moreover, Alan Artibise has argued that Cascadians on both sides of the border share a "bemused antipathy" toward their national capitals.[60] His suggestion resonates with the long British Columbian tendency to remain aloof from the rest of Canada. BC intellectual leaders such as painter and writer Emily Carr came to value provincial isolation. We can note the adamant Britishness of Victoria, the distinctiveness of the British Columbia environment, and the simple distance from Toronto and Montreal.[61] Indeed, as the Canadian economy fell behind the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s, British Columbians, as residents of the richest province, found a certain temptation toward casting their fate with the United States.[62]

Finally, the idea of emerging megaregions needs to be understood in the context of city-state theorizing. As discussed above, one of the basic arguments for thinking about North American megaregions is to compete effectively with Europe and Asia, a

goal embodied in language about “global gateway regions.” In turn, this thinking draws on the work of Kenishi Ohmae, who argued in the 1990s that the expanding global market is creating regional economic clusters with the potential to evolve into political communities rivaling and in some ways replacing nation states with “region states.”[63] When wealth comes in bytes rather than carloads and information is instantly portable, say enthusiasts of electronic communication, national boundaries will erode under a hail of faxes, e-mail messages, and hits on websites. When the world is deconstructed to a network of direct connections of person to person, people to people, and corporation to subcontractor, it is likely to be reconstructed around quasi-independent city-regions such as Cascadia, with semi-independent, multilateral connections to world economy.[64] Saskia Sassen, a leading theorist of global urbanization, suggests that the internal economic variety of megaregions enhances their self-sufficiency and supports the ability of megaregions to develop direct or “transverse” connections with the global economy independent of global cities like New York and Tokyo.[65]

Patrick Smith, a political scientist who has been studying “Cascadia” for many years, sees an emerging “globalist policy stance” with “institutionalization of global activity in the Cascadia city-region” in support of international linkages. He also argues that “territorial locations and inclinations have made the whole Cascadia region very much part of the Asia Pacific economy, even when much of its history links it to Europe.[66] This latter point is especially telling in British Columbia, given Canada’s close historical association with the United Kingdom, and points up BC’s longstanding ambivalence about the rest of Canada.

Conclusion:

Why this moment? Fairly clearly coincides with the end of the great North American boom of 1940-74 (the fourth Kondratieff wave). Both Americans and Canadians began to rethink their economic futures for an era of likely resource scarcity and shifting centers of economic power, calling into question two centuries in which regional identity revolved around resource exploitation. This necessity interacted with

rising environmentalism in the 1970s and 1980s to frame Ecotopia and Cascadia. It interacted with the accelerating shift to global economic networks and institutions in the 1990s to frame thinking about Mainstreet Cascadia and Megaregion Cascadia.

As suggested previously, the different conceptualizations all respond to two centuries of imagining the Northwest as a resource frontier, but they have also interacted with each other in a semi-closed dialectic. Ecotopia served as the first, naïve premise. Cascadia was a direct and antithetical response. Cascadia as a great, great land was in turn adapted (or "hijacked") by the Mainstreet Cascadia boosters and their reinvigoration of developmental rhetoric. And proponents of Megaregion Cascadia would argue that their most recent synthesis accommodates the possibilities of growth that is both globally connected and environmentally sensitive.

Finally, Northwesterners over the last four decades have been imagining difference from their larger nations rather than similarity. The emerging regional imaginary is both spatially and temporally separated. It emphasizes physical distance and difference from the Atlantic world while embracing the even vaster distances of the Pacific rim. It also looks away from its past. Other American regionalisms have struck deep roots into their regional pasts—whether these involve efforts to understand and celebrate the distinctiveness of an American South and southern culture, to preserve the heritage of Francophone Canada, or to probe the long multi-racial history of the Mexico-United States borderlands. In a manner that echoes the future-oriented boosterism of the resource development centuries, recent conceptualizations of northwestern North America look toward a future in which nation states will take second place to the conflicting imperatives of global economic flows and environmental systems.

FIGURES

1. Cascadia as urban region

2. National Resources Committee regions

3. Ecotopia per Joel Garreau

4. Cascadia as per David McCloskey

5. Cascadia ecoregions (McClosley)

6. Maritime Northwest (Bob Benson)

7. Salmon Nation (Ecotrust)

8. Salmon Nation logo

9. Mainstreet Cascadia

10. Vensecoma/Portlecouver advertisement

11. U.S. megaregions (Lang, 2005)

12. U.S. megaregions (Carbonell, et al., 2005)

13. U.S. megaregions (America 2050, 2009)

14. Cascadia megaregion (Geddes, 1997)

15. Cascadia Megaregion (Robert Yaro, 2007)

16. Cascadia megaregion (America 2050, 2009)

17. Northwest and continental rivers (McCloskey)

18. "The Rainforests of Home" (Ecotrust)

19. Global temperate rainforests



Figure 1: Pacific Northwest Urban Corridor



Figure 2: National Resources Board, 1935



Figure 3: Caacadia per Joel Garreau

MAP III: Cascadia As A Bioregion

Figure 4: Cascadia per David McCloskey

Figure 5: Cascadia river basins

Figure 6: Bon Benson's Maritime Northwest

Figure 7: Salmon Nation

Figure 8: Salmon nation logo

Figure 9: Mainstreet Cascadia

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Figure 10: "Cascadia" advertisement

Figure 11:Placeholder

U.S. MEGA-REGIONS



Source: Carbonell et all, 2005

Figure 12: U.S. megaregions



Figure 13: U.S. megaregions



Figure 14: Cascadia megaregion: 1997 version

Vancouver 2 million

Seattle 3 million

Portland 2 million

Victoria, Bellingham,
Salem, Eugene 1 million

Cascadia 8 million



Figure 16: Cascadia megaregion: 2009 version



Figure 17: Northwest and continental rivers





Figures 18, 19: Temperate rainforests

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66. Smith, "Branding Cascadia," 70, 72.